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Towards a global climate constitution 
Hans-Peter Weikard* 
1. Climate change and climate policies 
The composition of the atmosphere determines the climatic conditions on 
our planet. In recent years, supported by the results of Working Group III 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2008), a con-
sensus has emerged that emissions of greenhouse gases pose a major 
threat to climatic stability and are a source of catastrophic risk. Since the 
time of the British industrialisation the atmosphere has served as carbon 
storage for the fossil fuel-fired economies of industrialised and industrial-
ising countries. In the light of the facts of climatic change the need to 
limit carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions is generally acknowl-
edged. However, there is as yet no global system of property rights that 
governs greenhouse gas emissions. Concerning these emissions we are in 
a state of Hobbesian anarchy. The Kyoto Protocol does not implement 
effective constraints on greenhouse gas emissions and must be consid-
ered a failure (cf. Barrett 2009). What is urgently needed is a global con-
stitutional contract to overcome the inefficiencies and threats of a global 
“climate anarchy”. A constitutional contract would determine emission 
rights and the terms under which these rights can be exchanged or traded. 
In this paper my concern is the study of the incentives of individual 
countries to sign an international climate agreement that sets the terms of 
a climate constitution, that is, it establishes emission rights and rules for 
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trading these rights to combat the climate problem effectively and effi-
ciently. Here I will largely ignore concerns about fairness of the initial 
distribution of rights. Elsewhere I have discussed fair appropriation of 
resources in general (Weikard 1998) and with respect to greenhouse gas 
emission rights in particular (Weikard 2004). 
My approach to this problem links up with and extends a recent strand 
of literature on international environmental agreements (cf. Hoel 1992; 
Carraro/Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994, 2003). This literature starts out 
from the assumption that sovereign countries with no initial rules and 
regulations for the control of transboundary emissions will seek to reach 
agreement. However, no individual country can be forced to adhere to 
any rules unless it has signed an agreement and no country can be forced 
to enter an agreement to effectively establish emission rights. Signing an 
agreement is voluntary and it is assumed that a country will sign if its 
position as a signatory is better than as a non-signatory. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the group of signatories adopts joint climate policies that 
are optimal given the climate policies of non-signatories. Similarly, every 
non-signatory adopts an optimal climate policy given the climate policies 
of all others. Hence, we assume that climate policies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium of a transboundary pollution game. Further details of the 
game theoretical approach to this problem are provided in the next sec-
tion. 
Before I turn to the formal analysis I want to introduce and discuss 
two additional assumptions. First, we assume that sovereign countries, or 
their governments – these are the players in our game – are myopic in the 
sense that their concern is fully focused on the current decision whether 
or not to join an agreement. In particular, they do not consider the option 
to join the agreement later and they do not envisage that others may join 
later. This assumption is in line with the idea that often political agendas 
are short lived, a government’s term of office is limited to a few years 
and re-election is uncertain. The second assumption is the key idea of this 
paper. We assume that signing an agreement is an irrevocable commit-
ment. Once a country has signed the climate agreement it gives up its 
sovereignty in the domain of climate policy and it can never opt out after 
that. This may seem a strong assumption. However, it is not unprece-
dented in history. For example, countries composed of federal states do 
usually not allow that individual states break away. Another example is 
the formation of the European Monetary Union. Its members have signed 
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an irrevocable commitment to fix the exchange rates of their currencies 
forever and to give up their sovereignty in the domain of monetary pol-
icy. The national central banks have transferred their power to the Euro-
pean Central Bank. For climate policies, a World Environmental Organi-
sation (cf. Odendahl in this volume) could play the role of a climate gov-
ernment that enforces the rules of the climate constitution. In particular, it 
could monitor abatement targets and introduce and administrate appro-
priate instruments such as, for instance, a market for emission permits. In 
essence, a climate agreement that relies on an irrevocable commitment is 
a climate constitution, defines initial property rights (emission rights), 
and sets the rules for trading these rights. Such climate agreement, if 
signed by all countries, is a global climate constitution. 
In the following this paper explores how a global climate constitution 
may emerge as a sequence of accessions given that, in each round of ne-
gotiations, sovereign states are free to join or to maintain their independ-
ence. The aim is to unveil the determinants of the progress towards a 
global climate constitution. To that aim we study a sequential game (with 
myopic players). The game is introduced in the next section. Section 3 
discusses how the game is solved. Section 4 provides simulation results 
that illustrate the findings. Section 5 draws conclusions for climate poli-
cies. 
2. A model of sequential accession 
In recent years a standard model for the study of international environ-
mental agreements has emerged. This model is designed to study the in-
centives of individual sovereign countries to join an international agree-
ment to combat transboundary pollution. The model is a two-stage game 
where at stage 1 countries simultaneously sign or ratify an agreement or 
not and, at stage 2, they determine their abatement efforts where signa-
tory countries act jointly and non-cooperatively vis-à-vis other countries 
that have not signed the agreement.1 The second stage game is usually a 
standard transboundary pollution game as introduced by Mäler (1989) 
and further analysed by Folmer/von Mouche (2000). In the case of cli-
 
1 The first to study this kind of model were Hoel (1992), Carraro/Siniscalco (1993) 
and Barrett (1994). Finus (2003) provides a more recent survey. 
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mate change, greenhouse gases are global pollutants. Damages from cli-
mate change depend on the stock of greenhouse gases and are independ-
ent of the location of emissions. This, in turn, makes the abatement of 
greenhouse gases a global pure public good. It is well-known that in the 
absence of regulation and enforcement the private provision of public 
goods constitutes a social dilemma where the individual contributions 
fall short of the efficient levels. A social dilemma is characterised by 
free-rider incentives. Each individual country benefits from the abate-
ment of others while the individually chosen abatement levels disregard 
of the benefits that accrue to others. The inefficiencies of the private pro-
vision of public goods can be overcome by joint action. A global climate 
constitution, to which all countries subscribe, would set abatements to 
efficient levels. With appropriate redistributions – via the initial alloca-
tion of emission permits – each country will be better off with a global 
climate constitution compared to the absence of cooperation. 
Notwithstanding the efficiency of a global climate constitution, still 
there exist strong free-rider incentives. From the perspective of an indi-
vidual country it is usually preferable to not sign the climate agreement 
when others sign. At stage 1 of our game we assume that the agents are 
sovereign countries. As such they cannot be forced to enter the agree-
ment. Participation is voluntary. The irritating finding in this setting is 
that an efficient global agreement would emerge if the gains from coop-
eration are small. If, however, the gains are large then at best an agree-
ment with few participants can be reached (cf. Barrett 1994). This result 
stems from the fact that when stakes are high, free-rider incentives will 
be strong. 
In the following I will study this two-stage game, but I will assume 
that it is played for several rounds by myopic countries that make irrevo-
cable commitments. If an agreement is formed in one round, then all sig-
natories form a single player in the subsequent round. Hence, the game 
has (potentially) a different set of players in every round and is, there-
fore, not simply a repeated game. Our setting is a coalition formation 
game with sequential accession – but note that the decision to sign or not 
is taken simultaneously in any given round. Formally the game has infi-
nitely many rounds, but in practice it stops when all countries have 
signed the climate constitution. The results obtained below show that if at 
some stage an equilibrium agreement with few countries emerges, others 
will indeed have an incentive to join at the next stage. As no member 
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country is allowed to resign, the signatories become a single “large play-
er”. It is attractive, then, for others to join this large player as well. 
Now I introduce the game more formally. 
Consider a set of n countries, denoted by N. At stage 1 of the game 
each country i N∈  decides whether to sign a climate agreement or not. 
Those countries that sign, the group of signatories S N⊆ , adopt a joint 
best climate policy. Sometimes I will refer to S as the coalition. As every 
country is free to join, this type of game is an open-membership coalition 
formation game. Because there is a unique agreement – i.e. I do not con-
sider multiple agreements –, it is a cartel formation game. 
At stage 2 of the game the signatories S, acting jointly, and all other 
countries, acting individually, play a transboundary pollution game. 
More specifically non-signatories set abatement levels iq  to maximise 
their own payoff. The signatories adopt a joint climate policy and maxi-
mise their joint payoff, i.e. the sum of the payoffs of all coalition mem-
bers 
For a non-signatory country the objective function is given by 
(1) ( ) ( )i i i iV B q C q= − , 
where ( )i iC q  is the cost of own abatement and ( )iB q  with jj Nq q∈≡∑ is 
the benefit from global abatement. In our specific context the benefit of 
abatement is the avoided damage from climate change. In practice, of 
course, it will be very difficult to assess avoided damages (from storms, 
droughts or floods, for instance) because they are counterfactual, uncer-
tain, and subject to discounting as the largest damages will occur in the 
far future, decades or centuries ahead. 
For the group of signatories we write the objective function as 
(2) ( ) ( )S S S SV B q C q= − . 
To obtain simulation results and to illustrate the findings I adopt a par-
ticular specification. First, I assume that benefits are linear in abatement 
but they may differ across countries. Linear benefits are consistent with 
estimates used in the DICE model (Nordhaus 1997) and the estimates 
provided by the FUND model (Tol 2002). Second, I assume that abate-
ment costs are quadratic. This reflects increasing marginal abatement 
cost. However, we assume, for simplicity, that all countries have the 
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same cost function. Abatement costs can be interpreted to include costs 
of monitoring and enforcement of emission rights. The following specifi-
cations are used. 
(1′) 212i i iV b q cq= − , 
(2′) 212( )S i i
i S
V b q cq
∈
= −∑ , 
where 0ib >  is country i’s marginal benefits from abatement and 0c >  
is a cost parameter. 
As indicated before, the two-stage game of coalition formation and 
abatement is played sequentially for several rounds. Each round the game 
consists of the two stages just described. Hence, the first round starts 
with the formation of an initial agreement followed by the transboundary 
pollution game. In the second and all subsequent rounds signatories re-
main signatories as we assume an irrevocable commitment. The remain-
ing non-signatories, however, can announce their willingness to join at 
the first stage of each round. The second-stage game is then played by 
the coalition and the remaining non-signatories. We assume that coun-
tries are myopic and do not condition their choice of strategy on coalition 
formation at a later stage.2 Now we can turn to the analysis of the game. 
3. Solving the model 
To solve the model we first turn to the analysis of the two-stage game. 
This analysis is general and applies to every round of the game. This is 
due to the assumption of myopic players. The analysis employs back-
ward induction and I start with the second stage of a given round. At that 
stage a certain coalition S has formed. Hence, there are N S−  non-
signatories. The coalition and the non-signatories adopt abatement strate-
gies that are mutually best responses. Hence, we determine a Partial 
Agreement Nash Equilibrium (Chander/Tulkens 1995). Given our speci-
fication with linear benefits of abatement, countries have a dominant 
strategy, i.e. their optimal abatement level is independent of others’ 
choices. 
 
2 The case of forward looking countries that keep the option to renegotiate is ana-
lysed by Weikard and Dellink (2011).   
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For a non-signatory country j S∉  the optimal provision of abatement 
– maximising eq. (1′) – is 
(3) jj
b
q
c
= . 
The coalition partners i S∈  maximise their joint payoffs. Maximising 
eq. (2′) we obtain Samuelson’s rule for the optimal provision of a public 
good: the sum of the marginal benefit must equal the individual marginal 
abatement costs icq . Solving for iq  gives  
(4) 1i i
i S
q b
c ∈
= ∑ . 
Equations (3) and (4) determine equilibrium abatement levels for all 
countries for any given coalition S. The corresponding payoffs can be 
obtained from eqs. (1′) and (2′). The equilibrium abatement levels and 
the corresponding payoffs are unique. This implies that for any given 
coalition S the coalition payoffs and the payoffs of all non-signatories are 
uniquely determined (Folmer/von Mouche 2000). We can say that pay-
offs just depend on the coalition that forms and we re-interpret the payoff 
function and write it as ( )V S  instead of 1( ,..., )nV q q . The function ( )V S  
is called a partition function. 
To summarise, at stage 2 the transboundary pollution game determines 
a partition function that gives the coalition payoffs and the payoffs of all 
non-signatories for all possible coalitions S N⊆ . 
Before we can turn to the analysis of stage 1, where countries decide 
on coalition membership, we need to discuss how the coalition shares its 
payoff among its members. Of course, what an individual country gets 
within a coalition, i.e. when signing the agreement, is important for its 
incentives to sign. Hence, coalition formation will depend on the sharing 
rule that is employed by the coalition. Weikard et al. (2006) have exam-
ined how different sharing rules affect coalition stability. They find that 
sharing the gains from cooperation proportional to emissions gives rise to 
more effective climate coalitions than rules motivated by fairness, for 
instance when gains are distributed to favour poor countries. In the sub-
sequent literature it has been noted by Carraro et al. (2006), McGinty 
(2007), Weikard (2009) and Fuentes-Albero/Rubio (2010) that carefully 
designed sharing rules can improve coalition stability. In what follows 
we assume that the coalition employs a sharing rule that satisfies a Claim 
Rights Condition which says that the coalition payoff should be shared 
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such that each country’s claim should be satisfied whenever this is possi-
ble, i.e. whenever the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the members’ 
claims (cf. Weikard 2009). A country’s claim is the payoff it would re-
ceive if it remains outside the coalition. Formally this can be stated as 
follows: 
 Claim Rights Condition: For all i S∈  and all S N⊆ , 
( ) ( { })i iV S V S i≥ −  if and only if 
(5) ( ) ( { })S i
i S
V S V S i
∈
≥ −∑ . 
We can now turn to the analysis of the first stage of the game. Here we 
examine the incentives of countries to join a coalition. We are interested 
to identify stable coalitions. A coalition is stable if no member has an 
incentive to leave (internal stability) and no non-signatory has an incen-
tive to join (external stability). Formally we can define stability as fol-
lows: 
 Cartel stability (d’Aspremont et al. 1983): A coalition S N⊆  is 
internally stable if and only if ( ) ( { })i iV S V S i≥ −  for all i S∈ . It 
is externally stable if and only if ( ) ( { })j jV S V S j≥ ∪  for all 
j S∉ . A coalition is stable if and only if it is externally and in-
ternally stable. 
Consider now a particular coalition S. If the coalition payoff is sufficient 
to meet all claims and if the coalition payoff is shared such that the Claim 
Rights Condition is met, then no member of S will prefer to leave the 
coalition. Hence, S is internally stable. It is easy to see that every coali-
tion that is possibly internally stable under some sharing rule is also in-
ternally stable under any rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition. 
Hence, if we assume that the Claim Rights Condition is applied, internal 
stability of a given coalition can be checked by checking condition (5). 
Whether or not (5) holds depends only on the partition function. 
Equipped with these insights we can move to the stability analysis of 
our game. First, as a benchmark, consider a set of identical countries. 
Then, i jb b=  in equations (3) and (4). In this case any coalition with 3 
countries is stable (Barrett 1994; Weikard 2009). Every larger coalition is 
internally unstable. This holds regardless of the size of marginal benefits 
and the number of countries. Consequently if we have few countries, or 
few larger regions that represent a number of individual countries, then 
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we would find efficient (if there are just three regions) or almost efficient 
abatement levels. If we have many countries, the largest part of the po-
tential gains from cooperation remains unexploited. This just illustrates 
the well-known result that free-rider incentives increase with group size 
(Olson 1965). In fact, it illustrates that this result extends to coalition 
formation games. Figure 1 shows the global abatement level and the 
global net gains from abatement as a percentage of the efficient level for 
different numbers of countries under a stable 3-player coalition 
( 1; 1ib c= = ).3 
Figure 1: Relative efficiency of a three-player stable agreement 
 
 
 
3 This and the following figures are plots of simulation results from the model de-
scribed above.  
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Now we turn to the sequential play of several rounds of the two-stage 
game. Starting with identical players, the first round will generate a 3-
player coalition. This coalition acts as a single player in the next round. 
Hence, the total number of players is reduced to 2n −  after the first 
round. Because the coalition is a “large player”, it is an attractive coali-
tion partner in the second round of the game. It has been shown else-
where that increasing heterogeneity of players supports larger equilib-
rium coalitions (cf. Weikard 2009). Eventually then, in further rounds, 
more than three players will sign up. Hence, with irrevocable commit-
ment we expect that the number of countries that join the agreement is 
always higher in later rounds. In the next section we study this effect 
resorting to numerical simulation results. 
4. Simulation results 
Models of coalition formation are haunted by complexity. Even in a car-
tel game, where we rule out the coexistence of several agreements, we 
need to consider 2n n−  possibilities; an impossible task for a large num-
ber of countries. Hence, theoretical analysis has often adopted the as-
sumption of identical countries (cf. Finus 2003) and empirical analysis 
has worked with a small number of regions (e.g. Nagashima et al. 2009). 
Here I pursue a third possibility. Starting out from the idea that sovereign 
countries, not regions, are the signatories of a climate agreement, we 
want to have a model with many countries. Also we want to relax the 
assumption that countries are identical. However, differences between 
countries are captured in a stylised way. We construct a model where 
countries differ in size of marginal benefits of abatement. A country with 
high marginal benefits is a country that is vulnerable to climate change. I 
assume that countries’ marginal benefits are uniformly distributed in the 
interval [0, 2]  such that the average marginal benefit is 1. Also, as indi-
cated before, we assume identical abatement costs across countries 
( 1c = ). The results are obtained from numerical simulations. 
The coalition formation and abatement game is played for several 
rounds until a grand coalition, the global climate constitution, has 
evolved. 
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Figure 2: Scenario 1 – countries with identical costs and benefits 
 
 
Three different scenarios with 100 countries have been computed. The 
first scenario starts with our benchmark case of identical countries 
( 1; 1ib c= = ). Figure 2 shows how the coalition size evolves with the 
number rounds. Indeed, as stipulated before, the number of accessions is 
higher in later rounds. In the first two rounds the equilibrium coalition 
size is 3, i.e. the number of accessions is 2 in each round. In each of 
rounds 9 and 10, however, more than 20 countries join. After 10 rounds 
all countries have joined the global climate constitution and the game 
ends. 
The remaining two scenarios deal with the case of heterogeneous 
players, where players differ in marginal benefits of abatement. Typi-
cally, with many countries, we find multiple equilibria. In the first round 
every country could be in a coalition with few others. If countries are 
identical, it can be any three countries that form a coalition. While with 
identical countries the resulting global abatement is independent of the 
identity of the members – only the number matters –, this is different for 
heterogeneous countries. A coalition of vulnerable countries with high 
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marginal benefits will abate more than a coalition with the same number 
of countries but low marginal benefits. In principle, then, we have many 
equilibrium coalitions in each round and, therefore, many equilibrium 
paths of sequential accession. The scenarios computed describe two ex-
treme paths of accession. 
Figure 3: Scenario 2 – countries with heterogeneous abatement benefits, 
optimistic path of accession 
 
 
Scenario 2 is the optimistic scenario. It starts with a coalition of the coun-
tries with highest marginal benefits. For ease of reference I will call them 
“large countries”. These are subsequently joined by the remaining non-
signatories, again the largest of these join first. Scenario 3 is the pessi-
mistic scenario. Here it is assumed that countries with the lowest mar-
ginal benefits (“small countries”) sign the agreement first. The results for 
scenarios 2 and 3 are presented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. As ex-
pected, in the pessimistic scenario many more rounds of accession are 
needed to reach a global climate constitution. In the optimistic scenario 
almost 40 countries enter in round 8 and the global climate constitution is 
fully established after 9 rounds. In the pessimistic scenario, while the 
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general pattern of accession is the same, it takes 17 rounds to establish 
the global climate constitution. 
Figure 4: Scenario 3 – countries with heterogeneous abatement benefits, 
pessimistic path of accession 
 
 
The mechanism that drives these results is as follows. Large players, 
when joined by others, induce larger abatements and higher coalition 
benefits that can be redistributed according to the Claim Rights Condi-
tion to stabilise a coalition. If large countries make a start, an even larger 
player emerges in the next round. This speeds up the accession in all later 
rounds. By contrast, if small countries make a start, the resulting coali-
tion is not much larger, if at all, than other countries. A coalition of small 
countries will induce fewer accessions than a coalition of the same num-
ber of large countries. 
Figure 5 shows a comparison of the paths of accession. Figure 6 
shows the corresponding global abatement levels. While the optimistic 
scenario gives the same number of coalition members as the benchmark 
scenario up to round 5, note that abatement is higher because large coun-
tries abate more. By contrast, in the pessimistic scenario we have a 
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smaller number of accessions compared to the benchmark from round 3 
onwards. Abatement levels are well below both other scenarios. This is 
due to two effects. First, a coalition of large countries abates more than 
coalition of the same number of small countries. Second, a coalition of 
large countries forms a particularly large player that increases heteroge-
neity of players in subsequent rounds. This speeds up accessions. 
Figure 5: Comparison of accession paths of identical countries and 
heterogeneous countries with optimistic and pessimistic accession  
 
In the next section I briefly discuss some policy implications of these 
results, some limitations of my analysis and directions for further re-
search. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of global abatement levels of identical countries 
and heterogeneous countries with optimistic and pessimistic accession 
 
5. Implications for climate policies 
The results obtained from the simulations clearly show that the way to-
wards a global climate constitution can be shorter or longer. It will be 
shorter if countries with high marginal benefits sign the climate agree-
ment early. On the one hand, one may think that this is not only efficient 
but also a politically reasonable scenario. Those who benefit most from 
abatement should make a start. Gains from cooperation are larger if ac-
cession proceeds from the “larger” to the “smaller” countries. On the 
other hand, however, there may also be a political obstacle. High mar-
ginal benefits of abatement correspond – by construction of the model – 
to high marginal damages from climate change. Hence, this interpretation 
of our model suggests that the victims of climate change should move 
first towards higher abatement levels. Although emissions (and historical 
emissions) of greenhouse gases are not explicitly modelled, we may still 
conclude that an accession from “larger” to “smaller” countries will usu-
ally not be compatible with the polluters-pay principle. 
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In models of sequential accession it remains an open problem who en-
ters the agreement first. My modelling approach does not address this 
question. I just assume that in each round an equilibrium coalition is 
formed but I do not offer a criterion for equilibrium selection. Still the 
conclusion remains that if immediate action is required – as, for example, 
suggested by Stern (2008) –, then it is important that countries with large 
marginal benefits move first. This will bring significant abatement levels 
earlier.  
Another issue of practical political relevance is how efficient abate-
ment can be achieved. One of the possible tools is an emissions permit 
market (cf. Meyer in this volume). There are two important issues: effi-
ciency and coalitional stability. Clearly, the growth of the coalition over 
time implies that more and more externalities are internalised and abate-
ment targets increase. Therefore, the number permits in the market of the 
incumbent coalition members must decrease. If an optimal number of 
permits are initially allocated to the private sector in few countries of a 
small coalition, then, as the coalition grows, permits must be either ex-
propriated (perhaps gradually devaluated) or the government must buy 
them out and suspend them. The latter option seems to be more appropri-
ate if permits are sold or auctioned to firms upon their initial introduc-
tion. The former is more appropriate when firms receive permits free of 
charge under a “grandfathering” scheme. Concerning stability, the initial 
allocation of emission permits must be in line with the Claim Rights 
Condition. In practice this can be achieved if every country is fully com-
pensated for its abatement cost by redistributing the (value of) the bene-
fits of abatement. 
Finally, let me emphasise once again that the main driver of the evolu-
tion of a global climate agreement is the irrevocability of an initial com-
mitment. It precludes that any country that finds it beneficial to join the 
agreement at some stage will take a free-rider position at a later stage. 
While for the theorist this seems to be a strong assumption, it is not at all 
implausible in the political arena. While joining an agreement may in-
deed be voluntary, leaving an agreement will spoil the reputation and 
threaten cooperation in other domains. Hence, there is an extra cost that 
helps to stabilise agreements such that a global climate constitution can 
evolve. The important challenge is to make it evolve quickly. The recent 
climate summits of Copenhagen in December 2009 and Cancún in De-
cember 2010 have achieved little. Coalition formation models of the type 
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we have been discussing in this paper explain why an attempt to con-
struct a global climate constitution in one go must fail. The incentives to 
join are insufficient. My analysis suggests that an alternative political 
strategy to set up a small coalition of “the willing few” with full com-
mitment may be more successful. 
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